Barclays reports that humanoid robots could help alleviate 60% of the anticipated 37 million worker shortage in China by 2035.

      The recent note from the British bank predicts that humanoid robots could alleviate 60% of the anticipated decline in the labor force by 2035, as China's workforce is projected to decrease by 37 million people in the next decade. This would necessitate the deployment of up to 24 million humanoid robots.

      Barclays' research estimates that China's implementation of humanoid robots could counteract as much as 60% of the expected decline in its labor force by 2035.

      The calculations underpinning this estimate reveal its significance. According to Barclays' demographic projections, and assuming a 65% participation rate, China's working-age population is expected to decrease by 37 million in the upcoming ten years.

      Manufacturing constitutes about a quarter of China's economy, so a decline of 37 million workers is framed by the bank as an immediate industrial risk rather than a slow demographic issue.

      The latest insights from the EU tech arena, a narrative from the experienced founder Boris, along with some dubious AI-generated art, are all delivered weekly for free to your inbox—sign up now! Barclays' broader research, titled ‘Robots Roll Out, Economies Rewire,’ puts forth that fulfilling the anticipated gap at effective output levels, rather than just nominal employment, would require deploying as many as 24 million humanoid robots across the Chinese workforce by the mid-2030s, representing approximately 4% of the current labor force.

      The operational interest of the Barclays note lies in the underlying production dynamics the analysts reference. China has become the hub of the global humanoid-robot supply chain, measured in all available unit shipments.

      In 2025, Unitree shipped around 5,500 humanoid robots, leading the global market; Shanghai’s Agibot followed with 5,168 units, while UBTech produced approximately 1,000. The Chinese government has set a target for 2027 for integrating humanoid robots into manufacturing supply chains, along with a goal for a domestic humanoid-robot market valued at 300 billion yuan ($41 billion) by 2035.

      Barclays' figure of 'up to 24 million robots' is viewed as a maximum substitution estimate rather than a conservative prediction. MERICS's research on China's embodied-AI strategy provides further context.

      The bank's projection anticipates ongoing rapid declines in the costs of humanoid robots (with Unitree's industrial-grade products already retailing below $20,000 in certain configurations), sustained government support for pilot programs between humanoid robot manufacturers and state-owned factories, and the persistence of a 6-8% annual growth in manufacturing wages in eastern China, which has been a key driver for automation.

      However, the note takes a more cautious approach regarding the customer side of the supply chain. Independent surveys currently suggest that more than 150 manufacturers operate in the Chinese humanoid market, but only 23% of buyers report satisfaction with their purchased robots.

      The operational data provides a reality check, indicating that the deployment of 24 million units to meet Barclays' 60% offset estimate raises questions about commercial readiness that the current evidence does not clearly resolve.

      The geopolitical and corporate context adds a third dimension. According to Tesla's own reports, the company is ramping up production of its Optimus robot at its Shanghai Gigafactory, with the third-generation humanoid making its debut at AWE 2026 earlier this year.

      Barclays outlines a competitive landscape in which Chinese humanoids not only substitute for human workers in China but also rival Western humanoid offerings (such as Tesla Optimus and Figure 02, 1X Neo) that would otherwise vie for the same factory deployment spaces.

      At the industrial scale, the cost differences observed over the past two quarters serve as a key lever.

      On a macroeconomic level, Barclays presents a case specific to China. While the labor-force decline and automation parallels are evident in Japan, South Korea, Germany, and much of Eastern Europe, China is unique in combining (a) such a substantial demographic decline, (b) significant domestic manufacturing capabilities for robots, and (c) a policy framework that actively links the two. The note from Barclays articulates how this combination is relevant for macroeconomic forecasts.

      What the note does not clarify is the distinction between absorbed and displaced labor. A humanoid robot replacing a worker on a production line is a productivity gain in formal terms. The 60% offset figure presumes that the remainder of the Chinese economy can accommodate the 40% of the labor-force decline not compensated by robots.

      The two-decade demographic framework employed by Barclays is broad enough to make this assumption tenable at the macroeconomic level. However, at the level of social policy, this assumption will be a key concern for Beijing’s planning institutions over the next decade.